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Abstract
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) offers
broad protection for providers and users of interactive computer
services against liability for defamation and other content-based

>>

claims when a third-party provides the information. Although
providers and users of interactive computer services (ICSs) are
permitted to exercise some editorial control while still avoiding

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

legal liability, at some point, such editing may transform the
provider or user of the ICS into an information content provider
and deprive them of § 230 immunity. The key issue is where
the threshold between permissible and impermissible editorial
control lies. This Article delves into this issue by analyzing two
recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, Whitney Information Network v. Xcentric Ventures and
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., which indicate that even
relatively minor editing of content could deprive the provider or
user of the ICS of § 230 immunity.
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Practice Pointers

INTRODUCTION
<1>

In Whitney Information Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures,

L.L.C.

2

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit indicated that simply inserting a word, which may add
emphasis to the online text without altering the meaning, might
be enough to remove the provider or user of an interactive
computer service3 (ICS) from the protections granted by
Congress under the Communications Decency Act § 230
immunity. 4 The case raises serious questions about which party
bears the burden of proof in establishing whether the provider
or user of the ICS acted as a content provider.5
<2>

Since it was enacted in 1996, courts have interpreted § 230

to immunize Internet service providers (ISPs) and providers or
users of ICSs from tort violations committed by users over their
systems. 6 To lose § 230 immunity and become liable for
information posted by a third-party, providers or users of ICSs
generally have to make a significant contribution to the thirdparty material that alters its meaning. 7 The majority of circuits
have stated that simply in exercising the traditional editing
functions, such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone, or alter content, providers or users of an ICS did not
transform from service provider into a content provider.8 While
providers or users of ICSs are protected from liability by § 230,
content providers are not.9 However, Whitney raises questions
about the extent of editing that is permissible under § 230. 10
<3>

Moreover, dicta found in the recent case, Almeida v.

Amazon.com, Inc.,11 also indicates that the Eleventh Circuit
may be interpreting § 230 immunity to apply less broadly than
the other circuits. 12 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit appears
to be defining the line between ISP and content provider by
examining whether the provider filters or censors the
information, in addition to analyzing the role of the provider or
user of the ICS in editing content.13
<4>

This Article will first examine some of the problems

providers or users of ICSs face in making forums available for
their users, and case law on ICS liability before the passage of
§ 230. Then the Article will turn to existing case law indicating
that courts have interpreted § 230 of the CDA to confer broad
immunity. This case law suggests that providers or users of
ICSs may perform an array of editorial functions while
maintaining their status as such and retaining their § 230
immunity. Finally, this Article will examine the recent Eleventh
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Circuit cases Whitney and Almeida, in which the court indicates
that “traditional editorial functions” may not cover certain types
of ICS activities, removing providers or users of ICSs from the
shelter of § 230 liability.

BROAD INTERPRETATION OF § 230 OF THE CDA
Decisions Prior to the Passage of § 230
<5>

Prior to the passage of § 230, how the traditional concept

of defamation would be applied in the new Internet era
remained unclear.14 The increased prevalence of Internet chat
rooms, bulletin boards, and other forums for discussion led to a
far greater number of potential plaintiffs with defamation claims.
The anonymity of the Internet also left these plaintiffs unable to
identify the original “speaker” of that information.15 The law
was unable to adapt and keep up with the Internet’s explosive
growth, as evidenced by two inconsistent decisions regarding
providers’ or users’ of ICSs scope of liability, Cubby, Inc. v,
CompuServe, Inc. 16 and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co.,17 which occurred during the Internet’s earlier
years.
<6>

First, in 1991, the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York in Cubby held that a provider or
user of an ICS could only be held liable if it “knew or had
reason to know” of the allegedly defamatory statements.18 An
individual who alleged that a publication available on one of
CompuServe’s bulletin boards defamed him sued the
corporation. The court stated that CompuServe was acting as a
distributor of third-party information, similar to a library,
bookstore, or newsvendor, and found that once CompuServe
agreed to carry a particular publication, it had little or no
control over the editorial content. CompuServe was accordingly
allowed the heightened standard of liability applicable to
distributors. 19
<7>

Second, in an unpublished 1995 decision, the New York

Supreme Court in Stratton held that Prodigy could be liable for
an allegedly defamatory message that an unidentified user had
posted on a Prodigy bulletin board. 20 While the court accepted
the Cubby court’s ruling that a distributor may not be held liable
unless it had notice of the allegedly defamatory content, it held
that Prodigy was not the equivalent of a mere distributor.
Because Prodigy had advertised that it exercised control over
third-party content, the court concluded that Prodigy had
“opened it[self] up to greater liability than CompuServe and
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other computer networks” by failing to remove the alleged
defamatory material. 21 Prodigy, the Stratton court held, was
more akin to a traditional publisher, such as a newspaper,
because it exercised editorial control over its content.
<8>

Combined, these two decisions led to a rather bizarre legal

state of affairs, prompting Congressional action. 22 A provider or
user of an ICS who did not attempt to exercise editorial control
and thus contributed to the lingering presence of defamatory
information would not be held liable (Cubby),23 while a provider
or user of an ICS who did seek to exercise control would face
potential liability (Stratton).24 In response to the uncertainty
created by these two decisions,

25

combined with the desire to

promote the growth of the Internet while simultaneously
restricting access to objectionable material, Congress passed §
230.

Provisions of § 230
<9>

The Communications Decency Act became effective February

8, 1996.26 The CDA added § 230 to the Communications Act of
1934,27 and took a decidedly different approach towards libel
online. Perhaps due to fears that the Stratton decision would
serve as a disincentive toward exercising editorial control,
Congress overruled Stratton with § 230(c), labeled “Protection
for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material.” 28 Under § 230(c)(1), “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”29
<10>

Congress also specifically sought to immunize providers

and users of ICSs from liability for attempting to restrict access
to objectionable material. 30 Section 230(c)(2) states that no
provider or user of an ICS shall be held liable for any action
taken in good faith to restrict access to obscene material. The
language of the statute indicates that Congress had at least two
motives behind its actions. First, Congress sought to help the
embryonic online industry flourish. 31 Second, Congress sought
to encourage providers or users of ICSs to screen the content
they provide and to make available to their users the means to
limit their exposure to certain types of material. 32 In an
attempt to ensure that Congress’ policy judgments become the
law of the land, § 230(e)(3) states that “[n]o cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”33
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<11>

Since the immunity conferred by § 230(c)(1) is based on

the defendant’s status as a provider or user of an ICS, and
appears to apply even to publications made in bad faith, it is
generally seen as an absolute privilege against liability for thirdparty speech. 34 Section 230(c)(2) is also generally viewed as
conferring an absolute privilege; however, because §
230(c)(2)(A) applies only to actions “voluntarily taken in good
faith,” it appears to create a qualified privilege.

Decisions After the Passage of § 230
<12>

The statutory language of § 230 of the CDA does not

explicitly define the threshold where a provider or user of an
ICS is transformed into an information content provider through
the exercise of editorial control. It is difficult to determine what
constitutes being “responsible” for the creation or development
of information from the language alone.35 Accordingly,
providers or users of ICSs should look to the case history to
determine what constitutes permissible editing.
<13>

In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the Fourth Circuit

explicitly stated that simply exercising the traditional editing
functions, such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content, is not enough to transform an
individual from a provider or user of an ICS to an information
content provider.36 The court stated that § 230 creates federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service. 37 In reaching this holding, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized the threat that tort-based lawsuit pose to
freedom of speech in the Internet era and that § 230 was
enacted, in part, to promote the continued growth of the
Internet.38
<14>

Following the Fourth Circuit in Zeran, in 2004, the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar
decision in Ramey v. Darkside.39 The case involved a dancer
who sued a website publisher after one of its advertisers used a
photo of her without her permission. In its decision, the court
stated that, “because defendant did no more than select and
make minor alterations to the advertisement, it cannot, as a
matter of law, be considered the content provider of the
advertisement.” 40
<15>

Moving beyond the minor degree of editorial control

discussed in Ramey, the courts seem to have interpreted § 230
immunity to extend even where a provider or user of an ICS
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has exercised a significant amount of editorial control. For
example, in Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, the
Tenth Circuit held that even though AOL occasionally corrected
errors in stock quotations that appeared on its proprietary
network, AOL did not contribute to the “development or creation
of the stock quotation information.”41 Although AOL could
arguably have been considered “responsible” for the information
posted since it was corrected based on AOL’s notification, the
Tenth Circuit held that this was not enough to transform AOL
into an information content provider.42
<16>

Similarly, in Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.,43 the

Washington Court of Appeals held that Amazon was not liable
for negative comments posted on Amazon’s site by third parties
about plaintiff and his books. Although Amazon required that
postings satisfy the company’s guidelines, and reserved the
right to edit and/or remove such postings, the court held that
Amazon was a provider of an ICS entitled to avail itself of the
protections afforded by § 230. 44 In particular, the court stated
that Amazon was immunized from the claims in question
because they premised Amazon’s liability on its failure to
remove offending content originated by others, an editorial
function for which the statute was intended to provide
protection.45
<17>

The courts have gone a step beyond Zeran, Ben Ezra and

Schneider, and have held that providing a format for third-party
content is also not enough to make a provider or user of an ICS
an information content provider for the given form information.
In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit held
that an Internet matchmaker was not an information content
provider even though the website had provided a dating
questionnaire. 47 The Ninth Circuit made the distinction that
since the selection of the content was left exclusively to the
user, the fact that some of the content was formulated in
response to the questionnaire was irrelevant. 48 Similarly, eBay
has created a highly structured feedback system that provides a
specific format for users to enter content and that categorizes
each customer response. In Gentry v. eBay,49 the California
Court of Appeals held that the feedback system did not
transform eBay into an information content provider because
eBay did not create or developing the underlying information.50
<18>

Despite holding that § 230 immunity applies broadly, the

courts have recognized that once a provider or user of an ICS,
through its edits, significantly alters the meaning of the thirdparty information, the provider or user of the ICS becomes the
51
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information content provider for that altered content.

For

example, a provider or user of an ICS is clearly not acting
simply as an editor if it alters the statement “Fred is not a
criminal” by removing the word “not.” However, the courts have
never clarified the line between acceptable editing and the point
at which a provider or user of an ICS is transformed into an
information content provider. That line may fall fairly close to
the original content, according to the Eleventh Circuit.

WHITNEY INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. V. XCENTRIC VENTURES,
L.L.C.
<19>

In Whitney Information Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures,

L.L.C.,52 the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, interpreted § 230 to
apply less broadly than the other circuits and adopted a view
that was more like the New York Supreme Court’s opinion in
Stratton.53 Although this case cannot be said to constitute a
true circuit split because there are no other cases that
contradict the Whitney holding, two key elements of the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion indicate that this court may be taking
a different view of § 230 immunity than the other circuits. First,
the Eleventh Circuit indicated that inserting words within thirdparty content, which do not change the overall meaning but do
add emphasis, might be enough to deprive a provider or user of
an ICS of § 230 immunity. 54 Second, and perhaps more
significantly, the Eleventh Circuit shifted the burden of proving
that it was not an information content provider back onto the
provider or user of the ICS. 55
<20>

On its surface, Whitney is a classic § 230 case. The

defendants operate a website, ripoffreport.com, where
consumers can submit complaints about businesses. A user
posted a negative critique of the plaintiff, who runs real estate
training programs, on the website. Afterwards, the negative
critique was indexed by search engines, which resulted in users
accessing critical opinions of the plaintiff when they searched for
the plaintiff’s name or product. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued
for defamation.
<21>

The defendants were acting within the scope of § 230

immunity when they allowed a negative critique to be posted on
ripoffreport.com. However, the plaintiff also alleged that the
defendants altered the content of the critique by inserting words
such as “ripoff”, “dishonest”, and “scam.”56 The plaintiff asserts
that adding such words removed ripoffreport.com from the
protections of § 230.
<22>

In response, the defendants did not try to argue whether
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or not such revisions would transform them into an information
content provider; instead, they conceded that inserting those
words would constitute an “active participation” on their part in
generating the alleged defamatory content. As their defense, the
operators of ripoffreport.com presented affidavits, which tended
to show that they did not modify any of the posted content. The
website operators asserted that their policy was to review the
reports before posting solely to redact profanity, obscenity, and
personal contact information.
<23>

The Eleventh Circuit, however, was not satisfied with the

defendants’ affidavits, and found that they were not adequate to
shift the burden of proof back to the plaintiffs. Since the
defendants now had the job of proving that they acted as
providers or users of ICSs, and not content providers, the case
was remanded for further proceedings. 57 This holding has two
key implications: first, if the plaintiff is in fact able to show that
the defendants had added words such as “rip-off” and “scam” to
the third-party postings, Xcentric would no longer have § 230
immunity; and second, the defendants bear the burden of
rebutting the allegation that they acted as information content
providers.58
<24>

By implying in dicta that Xcentric would no longer have §

230 immunity if found to have inserted words into the thirdparty content, the Eleventh Circuit is providing insight into its
view of the scope of § 230 immunity and what it considers to
constitute a “traditional editorial function.” This case sits
between past cases — it is more than simply providing a form or
questionnaire, but less than drastically altering the meaning of
the posted content. As such, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Whitney could be said to be a clarification of the middle ground
between acceptable and unacceptable editing.
<25>

Some scholars, however, argue that the Eleventh Circuit is

deviating from the other circuits with its holding in Whitney.59
The crux of this argument is that Xcentric’s editing essentially
amounted to simply refining the content for style, and that
doing so is part of the traditional editorial functions. By implying
that Xcentric’s actions would be enough to deprive them of their
§ 230 immunity, these scholars argue that the Eleventh Circuit
is taking too narrow a view of the scope of § 230 immunity.
<26>

This conclusion is supported by the manner in which the

Eleventh Circuit referenced the definition of “information content
provider.” The Eleventh Circuit notes that the CDA defines an
“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other
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interactive computer service.” 60 This emphasis on partial
responsibility for the content indicates that, unlike the courts
which construe § 230 to provide broad immunity, that the
Eleventh Circuit may be more likely to hold a provider or user of
an ICS liable when it has made even a small contribution to the
defamatory content.
<27>

The Eleventh Circuit’s burden-shifting analysis in Whitney is

also extremely significant; it illustrates that the court may be
less sympathetic than other circuits toward providers and users
of ICSs. By placing the burden of showing that they did not act
as information content providers on Xcentric, the Eleventh
Circuit potentially exposed providers and users of ICSs to
greater responsibility in litigating § 230 claims. Under the
Eleventh Circuit’s view of § 230 immunity, while providers and
users of ICSs are certainly still not liable if they do not act as
content providers, the loss of that presumption is still significant
and points towards a narrowing of the scope of § 230 immunity.
<28>

Combined with their interpretation of what qualifies as a

“traditional editorial function” and the emphasis on being
“partially responsible” for the content, this burden shifting
indicates an overall unwillingness by the 11th Circuit to interpret
§ 230 immunity as broadly as is seen in the earlier cases. This
could serve as a warning to interactive computer services that
this court might be more likely to find that exercising editorial
control could transform it into an information content provider.

ALMEIDA V. AMAZON.COM, INC.
<29>

Dicta found in another recent Eleventh Circuit case,

Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

61

also indicates that the court

may be interpreting § 230 immunity to apply less broadly than
the other circuits. The Eleventh Circuit in Almeida ultimately
bases its decision on grounds other than § 230 immunity, but
makes several statements in a footnote, which implies that it
has a different interpretation of § 230 than the other circuits. 62
<30>

The Eleventh Circuit references the other circuits’

interpretation of § 230 immunity by stating that, “the majority
of circuits also read subsection (c)(1), though phrased as a
definition, to block civil liability when interactive service
providers refrain from filtering or censoring the information on
their sites.”63 This statement is significant for two reasons.
First, it implies that the Eleventh Circuit believes that the
subsection is properly read as a definition rather than as a
general conferral of immunity. Second, it implies that a provider
or user of an ICS would be transformed into an information
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content provider if the provider or user of the ICS did not
refrain from filtering or censoring the information. Other circuits
have interpreted § 230(c)(2)(a) to allow providers or users of
ICSs to take good faith actions to limit access to objectionable
content without being exposed to civil liability. 64 Thus, not only
is the Eleventh Circuit displaying a general disdain for the
common interpretation of § 230 as a conferral of immunity, but
it is also limiting the breadth of § 230 immunity by implying
that censoring or filtering information would transform a
provider or user of an ICS into an information content provider.
<31>

The Eleventh Circuit also notes in the same footnote that,

“as a factual matter, there is no indication that Amazon had
knowledge of the allegedly misappropriated image.” Although
the other circuits have repeatedly asserted that actual or
constructive knowledge is irrelevant to a § 230 determination, 65
this dicta implies that the Eleventh Circuit may be looking to
limit the application of § 230 immunity and might give some
weight to whether or not the provider or user of the ICS was
aware of the third-party content being posted. Providers or
users of ICSs should be aware that under the Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation of § 230, they may be more likely to be exposed
to liability for third-party content.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISIONS
<32>

While the Eleventh Circuit has indicated in dicta that it may

not interpret § 230 as a broad conferral of immunity, other
circuits have continued to hold that § 230 does indeed shield
providers or users from tort violations committed by users over
their systems. In fact, there is some evidence that the scope of
§ 230 immunity is still expanding.
<33>

An example of the expansion of § 230 immunity can be

seen by examining the courts’ treatment of two separate classes
of defendants. In 1998, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held that § 230
immunity bars claims against “interactive computer services”
(such as AOL) for information provided by another content
provider.66 As seen in subsequent cases, such as Ben Ezra, this
became the standard interpretation of § 230. In 2006, the
California Supreme Court, in Barrett v. Rosenthal, became the
first court to broaden § 230’s reach and hold that § 230
defamation immunity also extended to an individual Internet
“user” who is not a provider.67
<34>

On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in Whitney and

Almeida has not been the only court to question the proper
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interpretation of § 230 immunity. In Chicago Lawyers’ Comm.
For Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., the Northern
District of Illinois also questioned in dicta prior courts’
interpretations of § 230. 68 In particular, the court questioned
the holding of Zeran v. America Online, identifying three
problems with its holding. 69 First, the court stated that Zeran
overstated the plain language of the statute when it held that §
230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with third-party users of the service. 70 Second, the court found
Zeran’s holding to be internally inconsistent.71 Third, the court
noted that the application of the statute would be problematic,
inasmuch as the policy of encouraging providers of online
computer services to police for objectionable content is at odds
with the immunity that would attach to providers that choose to
do nothing to filter objectionable content.72 Despite the court’s
concerns with the shortfalls of Zeran’s interpretation of § 230,
the court ultimately held that Craigslist was entitled to
immunity, and noted that plaintiffs who attempt to hold ICSs
liable for content provided by others still have “a tough row to
hoe.” 73
<35>

In the face of competing court decisions regarding the

scope of § 230 immunity, the significance of the dicta found in
the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Whitney and Almeida should
not be overstated. While these cases may be an indication that
the Eleventh Circuit is interpreting § 230 to apply more narrowly
than other courts or even possibly indicative of an emerging
trend in § 230 immunity, they might also be examples of some
dissatisfaction with the current state of the law. The true
significance of Whitney and Almeida has yet to be determined.

CONCLUSION
<36>

Generally speaking, courts have interpreted § 230

immunity to apply broadly. As long as a provider or user of an
ICS does not stray from the traditional editing functions, he
does not become an information content provider and is not
liable for third-party content. The courts, however, have never
precisely indicated where the line is between simply editing
someone else’s content and being responsible for providing
some of that content. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit, in two
separate decisions, has shown a disinclination to interpret § 230
as a broad conferral of immunity and has indicated that tailoring
a third-party’s content to serve your purposes, while still
maintaining the overall meaning of the text, may transform a
provider or user of an ICS into an information content provider.
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This may simply be a clarification of the middle ground between
permissible and impermissible editing, or it may be indicative of
a desire to limit the scope of § 230 immunity. The Eleventh
Circuits’ decisions in Whitney and Almeida occurred during a
time in which some legal scholars have stated that § 230 should
be amended to narrow the immunity it confers on certain types
of websites. 74 Accordingly, website owners should be on notice
that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision may be part of a larger trend
of removing some of the protections of § 230.
<< Top

Footnotes
1. Karen Alexander Horowitz, University of Washington
School of Law, Class of 2008. Thank you to Professor
Jane Winn of the University of Washington School of
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2. Whitney Information Network, Inc. v. Xcentric
Ventures, L.L.C., 199 F. App’x 738 (11th Cir. 2006).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). “Interactive computer service”
is defined as any “information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.”
4. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of
Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2003).
5. Id. § 230(f)(3). Defined as “any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.”
6. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
328 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937
(1998). See also Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v.
America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir.
2000); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99
Cal. App. 4th 816, 830 (2002).
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source."). See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,
1029 (9th Cir. 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Green v. America Online,
318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Gentry, 99 Cal.
App. 4th at 829; Doe v. Franco Prod., 2000 WL
816779 (N.D.Ill. 2000). See generally Walter
Stillwell, Note, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com: An
Expansion of Tort Immunity for Web Service
Providers Under 47 U.S.C. § 230, Even When They
Take a Greater Editorial Role in Publishing Material
from Third Parties, 6 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 307
(2004).
8. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Batzel, 333 F.3d at
1031 n.18; Green, 318 F.3d at 471;
Optinrealbig.com, L.L.C. v. Ironport Systems, Inc.,
323 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119; Doe, 2000 WL 816779;
Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”
10. Whitney, supra note 2, at 743.
11. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th
Cir. 2006).
12. Id. at 1322 n.3.
13. Id.
14. Sean Whitworth and Ethenia King, Defamation and
the Internet: a Threat to Free Speech,
http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa99/whitworth_king/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
15. Historically, defamation consisted of slander and
libel. Slander is defamation by speaking, and libel is
defamation by means of writing. In modern times,
the legal distinction between libel and slander has
been narrowed. Most modern defamation cases
involve libel, and modern writers have come to use
the term "defamation" to describe both libel and
slander and “speaker” to describe the actor in both
written and oral communications.
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16. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995
WL 323710, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
18. Cubby, 776 F.Supp. at 140-41.
19. Since the plaintiff presented no evidence establishing
this requisite level of knowledge on CompuServe’s
part, the court granted summary judgment to
CompuServe. Cubby, 776 F.Supp. at 141.
20. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710.
21. Id. at *13.
22. Sarah B. Boehm, Note, A Brave New World of Free
Speech: Should Interactive Computer Service
Providers Be Held Liable for the Material They
Disseminate?, 5 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 7, (Winter 1998)
(“Following the differing opinions in Cubby and
Stratton, it became obvious that Congress needed to
‘step in’ and address the issues surrounding
defamation law on the Internet.”).
23. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. 135.
24. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710.
25. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)
("One of the specific purposes of this section is to
overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions which have treated such providers
and users as publishers or speakers of content that
is not their own because they have restricted access
to objectionable material.").
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2003).
27. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et.
seq.
28. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
Additionally, Judge Wilkinson concluded in Zeran,
supra note 6, 129 F.3d at 331 that Congress enacted
§ 230 "to remove the disincentives to self-regulation
created by the Stratton Oakmont decision."
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
30. Id. at § 230(b)(4) (“It is the policy of the United
States to … remove disincentives for the
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development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their
children's access to objectionable or inappropriate
online material….”).
31. Id. at § 230(a)(4) (“The Internet and other
interactive computer services have flourished, to the
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (It
is the policy of the United States “to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive
media”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (It is the policy of
the United States “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”).
32. Id. at § 230(a)(2). The Internet and other ICSs
“offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the
potential for even greater control in the future as
technology develops” Id. at § 230(b)(3): It is the
policy of the United States “to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the
Internet and other interactive computer services” Id.
at § 230(b)(4): It is the policy of the United States
“to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children’s access
to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”
See also H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996)
(Conf. Rep). (There is an “important federal policy of
empowering parents to determine the content of
communications their children receive through
interactive computer services”).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). C.f. Id. ( “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this
section.”)
34. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; Blumenthal, 992 F.
Supp. at 50; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and
the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the
Internet, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 149-50 (1997) (In light
of §230, “a print newspaper could face liability for
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printing a defamatory letter to the editor, while the
publisher of an electronic newspaper would be
immune from liability for carrying unedited the same
text, even if the publisher of the electronic
newspaper acted with the requisite degree of
culpability.”).
35. The relevant portion of the statute, 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1) asserts that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” The statute
provides the following definitions to assist in
distinguishing between an interactive computer
service and an information content provider: an ICS
is “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.” Id. at § 230(f)(2). An
information content provider, on the other hand, is
defined as “any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.” Id. at §
230(f)(3).
36. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (holding that AOL was not
liable for failing to respond to bogus advertisements
for offensive T-shirts celebrating the bombing of the
Oklahoma City federal building posted on its bulletin
boards after being made aware of their malicious
and fraudulent nature).
37. Id.
38. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
39. Ramey v. Darkside Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10107 (2004).
40. Id.
41. Ben Ezra, supra note 6, 206 F.3d at 985-86 (holding
that where AOL hosted stock-quote providers on its
proprietary network and occasionally corrected errors
in their stock quotations, “such communications
simply do not constitute the development or
creations of the stock quotation information” and
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“imposing liability on Defendant for the allegedly
inaccurate stock information … would ‘treat’
Defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker,’ a result §
230 specifically proscribes.”)
42. See Id. (“Plaintiff argues that Defendant deleted
some stock symbols or other information from the
data base in an effort to correct the errors. Plaintiff
further argues that such alteration of information
constitutes ‘creation or development’ of information
and transforms Defendant into an ‘information
content provider.’ By deleting the symbols, however,
Defendant simply made the data unavailable and did
not develop or create the stock quotation
information displayed.”).
43. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2001).
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 41.
46. Carafano, supra note 6.
47. Id. at 1121.
48. Id. at 1124.
49. Gentry, supra note 6.
50. Id. at 829.
51. See Barrett, supra note 7, at 60 ("active involvement
in the creation of a defamatory Internet posting
would expose a defendant to liability as an original
source."). See generally, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Bloggers’ FAQ: Section 230 Protections,
http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-230.php (last
visited Feb. 22, 2007).
52. Whitney, 199 F. App’x 738. Whitney is the second of
three 47 U.S.C. § 230 cases involving
badbusinessbureau.com/RipoffReport.com, and is the
only one of the three where the defendants were
granted § 230 immunity. See MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 2004 WL 833595
(N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the defendants are
information content providers not entitled to § 230
immunity because defendants themselves create,
develop, and post original, defamatory information).;
Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38082 (D. Ariz. 2005) (finding that §
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230 does not apply where plaintiffs alleged that they
are suing based on content authored solely by the
defendants). See generally Eric Goldman,
RipoffReport.com Loses 47 USC 230 Motion to
Dismiss--Hy Cite v. badbusinessbureau.com,
Technology

and

Marketing Law Blog,

http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/01/ripoffreportcom_1.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
53. Stratton, supra note 17.
54. Whitney, supra note 2, at 742 (stating that the
allegations of Whitney’s complaint would be enough
to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute which requires
that the Defendant commit a tortious act in the
state).
55. Id. at 744 (finding that the “district court … erred
when it shifted the burden of proof to Whitney based
on Defendants' declarations and then granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss based on Whitney's
failure to substantiate its allegations with evidence.”)
56. Id. at 740.
57. Whitney, supra note 2, at 744.
58. The defendants were using § 230 immunity as a
defense against jurisdiction. They argued that if they
were immune from tort liability, then there could be
no tortuous conduct directed towards the state, and
therefore no personal jurisdiction under the long arm
statute. To support their argument for § 230
immunity, the defendants submitted affidavits that
supported their argument that they were not
responsible for modifying any postings made to their
sites. The district court held that the affidavits put
the burden back on the plaintiff to come forward
with more evidence supporting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. It found that the plaintiff’s
failed to meet that burden, so it dismissed the case.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the
defendant’s affidavits were insufficient to shift the
burden back to the plaintiffs.
59. Eric Goldman, Whitney Information v. Xcentric
Update (2006), Technology

and

Marketing Law Blog,

http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/whitney_informa.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
60. Whitney, supra note 2 at 744 (emphasis added by
the court).
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61. Almeida, supra note 11. In Almeida, a publisher
published a child’s photo on the cover of a book. The
publisher got the requisite publicity consent for the
first edition, but there are differing views about
whether the consent extended to a second edition.
Amazon displayed the second edition's book cover
on its product page for the book. The plaintiff
acknowledged that Amazon was an interactive
computer service, but alleged that the company
acted as an information content provider as well.
62. Id. at 1322 n.3.
63. Id.
64. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y.
1999).
65. See Zeran, supra note 6, at 331; Blumenthal, supra
note 7, at 50. See generally David Sheridan, supra
note 34.
66. Blumenthal, supra note 7. Drudge published a story
about Blumenthal that quoted an anonymous source
as saying that Blumenthal abused his spouse. The
Blumenthals filed a Complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia demanding
$30,000,001.00 in damages on each of 21 counts.
Blumenthal also named America Online as a
defendant, alleging that it was liable for Drudge's
defamation.
67. Barrett, supra note 7, at 60.
68. Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the
Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill.
2006).
69. Id. at 693-696.
70. Id. at 693.
71. Id. at 694.
72. Id. at 695.
73. Id. at 698 n.15.
74. See Anita Ramasastry, Is an Online Encyclopedia,
such as Wikipedia, Immune from Libel Suits?
FindLaw.com (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20051212.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007) See also James P. Jenal,
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When Is a User Not a "User"? Finding the Proper
Role for Republication Liability on the Internet
(2004) 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 453, 477-480 (the
author posits four categories of "users," Readers,
Posters, Moderators, and Administrators, and would
deprive Posters of immunity).
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